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the latter group of cases are suits for divorce and annul-
ment of marriage. It thus appears that with the exception
of cases for which a statute specifically provides a special
form of remedy and in divorce and annulment proceedings,
Maryland litigants may now choose as a method for seek-
ing judicial relief either one of the established remedies at
law or in equity or the more expeditious and less quarrel-
some method of suit for declaratory judgment. If the
second choice is made and contested, it is to be hoped that
the Court of Appeals will construe the new Act in the spirit
in which it was re-enacted by the General Assembly.
RECENT CHANGES AFFECTING MINORITY STOCK-
HOLDERS' SUITS
It is a familiar principle that the right to control the
affairs and management of a corporation and to dictate its
policies can be exercised by the majority of the holders
of stock having voting power in that corporation. The
rights of the minority stockholders are not many. In gen-
eral they are protected only against fraudulent, illegal and
ultra vires acts of the majority.1 This protection can be
obtained by the use of the device known as the minority
stockholders bill. Recently in Maryland, the use of this
device has been limited by a decision of the Court of
Appeals and by legislative enactment.
In Eisler v. Eastern States Corporation2 the Court of
Appeals was faced with the problem of the right of a
entitled a "Memorandum" which in effect stated that the property of the
Consolidated should 'be considered as a whole for the purpose of deter-
mining its rate base. Subsequently, Rustless Iron & Steel Corporation,
an intervenor before the Commission, filed a bill of complaint In the Circuit
Court of Baltimore -City, which sought a reversal of the so-called "Memo-
randum". One of the arguments urged by the plaintiff (or more accu-
rately the Appellant) was that it was entitled to relief under the new
Declaratory Judgments Act. The Court denied this contention on two
grounds, 1. e. that the litigation was of a type for which a statute provided
a special form of remedy, and that the present case was an appeal which
was not regulated or controlled by the Act. With respect to the first
point, It should be observed that where another statute has specifically
provided for a method of procedure that the Act may not be used. This re-
sults from the obvious fact that the General Assembly did not Intend that
a declaratory judgment should be sought where it had previously provided
a specific form of proceeding for a special type of case. Where such a
statute exists, therefore, litigants should be bound to seek relief thereunder,
and in such cases the alternative argument that If relief cannot be ob-
tained thereby it should be forthcoming under the Declaratory Judgments
Act should not be countenanced.
I 18 C. J. S. (Corporations) §496.
2182 Md. 329, 35 A. (2d) 118 (1943).
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minority stockholder to complain of a transaction occur-
ring prior to his acquisition of stock.3  The plaintiff, a
stockholder in the defendant corporation, sought the ap-
pointment of a receiver for the defendant with full power
to sue its officers and directors for violation of their trust
duties as officers and directors. The plaintiff alleged that
in 1930 he purchased two hundred shares of common
stock of the defendant and in the same year he purchased
three hundred shares of similar common stock as president
of The Leshire Corporation. It was alleged in the bill
that the defendant corporation was organized as an invest-
ment company in 1925 for the purpose of raising money for
the St. Regis Paper Company and in 1928 the defendant
transferred $18,577,593.69 to the St. Regis Paper Company
for which it received 1,000,000 shares of the common stock
of St. Regis. It was charged that the directorate of the
defendant and St. Regis was interlocking and that the pur-
pose of the transaction was to further the individual inter-
est of the common officers and directors of St. Regis and
the defendant and not to promote the interests of the
defendant corporation. A statement of the defendant's
investments as of December 31, 1941, showed total invest-
ments of $19,834,111.33 with a market value of $1,956,258.
It was alleged that since the plaintiff had acquired his
stock, the changes in the defendant's portfolio had been
relatively insignificant and would not exceed $150,000.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the second
amended bill of complaint without leave to amend. The
opinion of the lower court pointed out that no imminent
danger of waste or loss by reason of contemplated acts of
the officers or directors was charged by the .plaintiff. The
court further stated that the defendant had no funded
debt, was clearly solvent and that the essence of the com-
plaint was that 90% of the assets of the defendant were
used to purchase $18,500,000 worth of stock of St. Regis
which had depreciated in value to $1,750,000. The Court
held' that although an elaborate scheme to mulct the
corporation and to waste and dissipate its assets was
charged, there were not sufficient facts alleged to sustain
the charges; and since the power to appoint a receiver was
3 The case was previously before the Court of Appeals on a question in-
volving the use of the Discovery Rules. Eastern States Corporation v.
Eisler, 181 Md. 526, 30 A. (2d) 867 (1943). On the question of whether
the premium on a surety bond filed to stay an order of the lower court
pending an appeal is taxable as costs, see Eisler v. Eastern States Cor-
poration, Baltimore Daily Record, April 21, 1945, on appeal Court of
Appeals of Maryland, October Term, 1945, No. 94.
4 Record pp. 30-33.
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discretionary, the Court would not exercise its discretion
in the absence of a clear showing why it should do so.5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Its decision
was placed on two grounds, approval of the reasons given
by the lower court and a holding that the plaintiff, who
was not a stockholder at the time when the transaction of
which he complained took place, had no standing to object.
About the latter, the lower Court had said, "It is not neces-
sary to decide, at the present time, whether or not this
stockholder can complain of acts which took place prior to
his acquisition of stock" but the Court of Appeals held
"* * * the Appellant (stockholder) does not have the
standing to complain of acts and management of the Cor-
poration prior to the time that he became a shareholder
thereof."
In reaching this result, the Court relied on the case of
Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Company 6 which in turn
had quoted with approval from the leading case of Home
Fire Insurance Company v. Barber.7 While on its facts
the Headley case held merely that a corporation could re-
cover excessive salaries paid to former officers for the
benefit of minority stockholders to the extent that the
minority stockholders were not barred by laches, limita-
tions, acquiescence or by the disqualifications of prior
holders of the stock, the Court cited with approval the
rule barring all stockholders from complaining of trans-
actions which took place prior to their acquisition of stock.
Naturally this decision lead to some confusion as to the
exact status of the rule in Maryland. One text writer and
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit 8 regarded the case as a flat denial of the right of
a stockholder to complain of transactions occurring prior
to his purchase of stock. A contra view was taken in the
REVIEw. 9 There it was strenuously argued that the Headley
case could and should be distinguished from those cases
in other jurisdictions which denied the right to sue to all
subsequent stockholders, because it was thought that the
less stringent rule was more desirable. An examination
of the cases at that time disclosed that the numerical
weight of authority was, in favor of the rule permitting
5 The court relied on Williams v. Salisbury Ice Company, 176 Md. 13,
3 A. (2d) 507 (1939).
e 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645 (1917).
767 Neb. 657, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903).
SBRUNE, MARYLAND COs'OrRATION LAW (1933) 176; McQuillen v. National
Cash Register Co., 112 F. (2d) 877, 882 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
9 Sykes, Right of Stockholder to Attack Transactions Occurring Prior to
His Acquisition of Stock (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 380.
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suits by stockholders who did not acquire their stock until
after the transaction of which they complained.
A reexamination of the cases discloses that since 1940
no jurisdiction has joined the states permitting suits by
subsequent stockholders. Indeed the Illinois Court, which
had been considered in accord with the weight of authority
has construed its prior holding as authority for the rule
that a subsequent stockholder has no standing to com-
plain.10 The action of the Illinois Court seems indicative of
the trend, for courts in Florida, Maryland and South Da-
kota have recently decided in favor of the view that a
stockholder cannot complain of a transaction occurring
prior to his acquisition of stock." By statute, Delaware,
New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania have joined this
group; 12 land Kansas and Louisiana should probably be
classed with the states holding to this view." The present
weight of authority is 11 jurisdictions (counting England)
permitting subsequent stockholders to complain' 4 and 19
jurisdictions (counting the Federal courts) not permitting
subsequent stockholders to complain.15
10 Goldberg v. Ball, 305 Ill. App. 273, 27 N. ED. (2d) 575 (1940), citing
Bilhuber v. Bilhuber-Wawak Co., 245 Ill. App. 552 (1927).
11 Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. (2d) 741 (1941) ; Eisler v.
Eastern States Corporation, 182 Md. 329, 35 A. (2d) 118 (1943) ; Jepson
v. Peterson, 10 N. W. (2d) 749 (S. Dak. 1943).
12 Delaware Corporation Law §51A; N. Y. General Corporation Law
§61; N. J. Statutes Ann. 14:3-16; Pennsylvania, Laws of 1945, Act. No. 114.
18 Mitchell v. Beachy, 110 Kan. 60, 202 Pac. 628 (1921); Mullins v.
DeSota Securities Co., 45 F. Supp. 871 (D. C. W. D. La. 1942), citing Von
Schlemmer v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 121 La. 987, 46 So. 991 (1908).
14 Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 459; Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403,
8 So. 788 (1891) ; Harvey v. Meigs, 17 Cal. App. 353, 119 Pac. 941 (1911) ;
Just v. Idaho Canal Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102 Pac. 381 (1909) ; Mason v. Car-
rothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030 (1909) ; German Corp. v. Negaunee Ger-
man Aid Soc., 172 Mich. 650, 138 N. W. 343 (1912) ; Forrester v. Boston
Mining Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898) ; Windsor v. Bailey, 55 N. H.
218 (1875); Dissette v. Publishing Co., 9 Ohio Circ. Ct. (N. S.) 118;
North v. Union Savings & Loan Assn., 59 Ore. 483, 117 Pac. 822 (1911)
Robertson v. Draney, 53 Utah 263, 178 Pac. 35 (1919).
15 Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Col. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907) ; Journal Corp. v.
Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. (2d) 741 (1941) ; Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536,
8 S. E. 630 (1889) ; Goldberg v. Ball, 305 Ill. App. 273, 27 N. E. (2d) 575
(1940) ; Clark v. American Coal, 86 Iowa 436, 53 N. W. 291 (1892) ; Mitchell
v. Beachy, 110 Kan. 60, 202 Pac. 628 (1921) ; Neff v. Gas & Electric Shop,
232 Ky. 66, 22 S. W. (2d) 265 (1929); Mullins v. DeSota Securities Co.,
45 F. Supp. 871 (D. C. W. D. La. 1942); Eisler v. Eastern States Corp.,
182 Md. 329, 35 A. (2d) 118 (1943) ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb.
644, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903); Rankin v. Brewery & Ice Co., 12 N. M. 54,
73 Pac. 614 (1903) ; Moore v. Silver Mining Co., 104 N. C. 534, 10 S. E. 679
(1890) ; Jepson v. Peterson, 10 N. W. (2d) 749 (S. Dak. 1943) ; Pitcher v.
Lone Pine-Surprise Consol. Mining Co., 39 Wash. 608, 81 Pac. 1047 (1905) ;
Delaware Corporation Law §51A; N. $. General Corporation Law §61b;
N. J. Statutes Ann. 14:3-16; Pennsylvania, Laws of 1945, Act. No. 114;
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23 (b).
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As if to remove any doubt regarding the conclusiveness
of the holding in the Eisler case the General Assembly, at
its 1945 session, enacted as the law of Maryland the Federal
rule which requires a stockholder, in bringing suit on
behalf of his corporation, to establish that he owned his
stock at the time of the transaction of which he complains
or that it thereafter devolved on him by operation of law.16
This statute is similar to those passed in Delaware, New
York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 17 Apparently it adds
nothing to the rule of the Eisler case except in permitting
suits by subsequent stockholders whose shares have de-
volved on them by operation of law. It, of course, re-
moves from the courts the inherent power to make excep-
tions when faced by unusual and special circumstances,
except as a matter of statutory interpretation. In the Fed-
eral courts, the phrase devolution of law has been inter-
preted by inference to encompass such situations as title
acquired by a trustee who is appointed to that office after
the transaction complained of but where the trust estate
owned the stock prior to the transaction complained of;' 8
and where the complaining stockholder acquired his stock
by gift or inheritance after the transaction complained of
but from someone who owned it prior to the transaction
complained of.19
The reasons for the Federal rule (and thus, indirectly,
the reasons for the Maryland rule) have been much de-
bated. In Quincey v. Steel,20 the rationale of the rule was
described as an attempt to prevent the practice of transfer-
ring stock to a non-resident for the purpose of acquiring
Federal diversity jurisdiction. Dean Pound in Home Fire
Insurance Co. v. Barber,2' ascribed a broader reason behind
the rule which has been widely accepted as follows:
"The rule that a suit for mismanagement cannot be
maintained by one who was not a stockholder at the
time has been criticized as based on jurisdictional con-
siderations peculiar to the Federal courts and on obso-
lete common-law doctrines as to champerty and main-
tenance.... In our judgment it does not depend upon
2OMd. Laws 1945, Ch. 1072.
17 Delaware Corporation Law §51A; N. Y. General Corporation Law §61;
N. J. Statutes Ann. 14:3-16; Pennsylvania, Laws of 1945, Act. No. 114.
11 McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 22 F. Supp. 867 (D. C. Md. 1938),
aff'd, 112 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
l0 Whitaker v. Whitaker Iron Co., 249 Fed. 531, 536 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918),
cert. denied, 248 U. S. 564, 39 S. Ct. 8, 63 L. Ed. 423 (1918).
o 12M U. S. 241, 7 S. Ct. 520, 30 L. Ed. 624 (1887).
167 Neb. 657, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903).
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either. The Federal Equity rule, while designed in
part to prevent collusive proceedings in fraud of juris-
diction of those courts, goes far beyond the require-
ments of such a purpose.... The rule has its founda-
tion in a sound and wholesome principle of equity,
namely that the rules worked out by chancellors in
furtherance of right and justice shall not be used, be-
cause of their technical character, as rules to reach
inequitable or unjust results. 22 Resting on that basis,
the value and importance of the rule... are constantly
manifested.... The right of a stockholder to sue exists
because of special injury to him for which he is other-
wise without redress. If his interest is trifling, and
the injury thereto of no consequence, he cannot sue
or compel righting of wrongs to the corporation....
Hence there is obvious reason for holding that one who
held no stock at the time of the mismanagement ought
not to be allowed to sue, unless the mismanagement
or its effects continue and are injurious to him, or it
affects him specially and peculiarly in some other
manner."
These explanations should be contrasted with the rea-
sons said to be behind the rule which permits a stockholder
to complain of transactions occurring prior to his acquisi-
tion of stock. It is said that any cause of action which can
be asserted on behalf of the corporation becomes part of
the corporate estate and should be considered as a cor-
porate asset. Each stockholder has an interest in the entire
concern and each stockholder is entitled to his proportion-
ate share of the corporate estate regardless of when he
acquired his stock. Thus a stockholder acquires an inter-
est in all the corporate assets whether they came into being
before or after he acquired his shares, and the right to
assert a claim arising out of a transaction occurring before
his purchase of stock is no exception to this rule."
The Maryland legislature in 1945 passed another act
which also affects the right of a minority stockholder to
maintain suit. 4 This act provides that in any action brought
on behalf of a foreign or domestic corporation the corpora-
tion may require the plaintiff at any time before final judg-
ment to give security for the reasonable expenses, exclud-
ing counsel fees, which may be incurred by the corpora-
tion unless the plaintiff or plantiffs own (1) 5% of the
22 Italics supplied.
2' 1 MORA,VETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2 ed. 1886) 254, sec. 265.
-" Md. Laws 1945, Ch. 989.
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corporation's stock of any class or (2) stock of any class
having a market value in excess of $25,000. Upon the
termination of the action, the corporation is given recourse
to the security in an amount fixed by the court having
jurisdiction.
This action on the part of the Maryland legislature is
not entirely original. New York passed a similar statute
in 1944 25 and the New York statute was adopted in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1945,26 after the passage of
the Maryland statute. In order to gauge the effect of the
Maryland statute, it is helpful to compare it with the New
York statute. The New York statute provides that in any
action brought on behalf of a foreign or domestic cor-
poration the corporation may require the plaintiff at any
time before final judgment to give security for the reason-
able expenses, including counsel fees, which may be in-
curred by the corporation unless the plaintiff owns (1) 5%
of the outstanding stock of any class or (2) $50,000 worth
of stock of any class. Recourse to the security is to be
fixed by the court at the termination of the action.
It will be seen that the New York and Maryland stat-
utes differ in two important respects. One of the provisos
in the Maryland statute whereby the plaintiff is excused
from posting security is the ownership of $25,000 worth of
stock in the corporation in whose behalf suit is brought.
In the New York statute, this is fixed at $50,000. More-
over the New York statute requires the posting of security
for the reasonable costs including counsel fees incurred by
the corporation while the Maryland statute excludes coun-
sel fees." This distinction is doubly important when it is
borne in mind that by an earlier statute a corporation, in
New York, is made liable for counsel fees incurred by its
officers and directors in successful defense of a suit brought
against them on behalf of their corporation.2
It is interesting to note the curious history of judicial
determination of the constitutionality of the New York
'5 New York General Corporation Law, §61-b.
28 N. 3. Statutes Ann. 14:3-15.
27 The New Jersey statute exemption is fixed at $50,000 and requires
security for expenses, including ounsel fees. The Pennsylvania exemption
is 5% of stock, of any class, and security for expenses including counsel
fees is required.
28 New York General Corporation Law, §64. Until 1945, this provision
was found in §61-a, which differed from the present statute by permitting
reimbursement to party plaintiffs as well as to party defendants. It is
claimed that the amendment makes no change because §61-a was held only
declaratory of the common law in Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222,
39 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1942), and §5 of the amending act preserves the
common law right.
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statute. In Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 9 a derivative stockhold-
ers suit was instituted in 1940 in which an accounting was
sought for money paid out from 1934-1939 in an allegedly
illegal profit-sharing plan. After passage in 1944 of the
New York statute requiring security for reasonable ex-
penses, including counsel fees, a motion was made to re-
quire such security. The motion was granted and the
plaintiffs then assailed the constitutionality of the statute.
The statute was held constitutional on the theory that
there had admittedly been abuses of minority stockholders
suits, that this was a regulation aimed at correcting those
abuses and that the determination by the legislature of
the "reasonableness" of the regulation was binding on the
Court. As a subsidiary question the Court also decided
the statute applied to proceedings which were pending
when it was passed. An appeal was allowed to the Court
of Appeals. Before the decision of that Court, the statute
was both held unconstitutional in Citron v. Mangels Stores
Corp.0 on the theory that it was a deprivation of property
without due process of law, with no appeal to the Court
of Appeals allowed, and held constitutional in Wolf v.
Atkinson 81 on the authority of the Shielcrawt case. When
the Court of Appeals decided the Shielcrawt case, it held
the statute not applicable to actions pending at its passage
and refused to pass on the question of constitutionality.
That question is still open for determination by the Court
of Appeals. Meanwhile much confusion exists. 2
The New York statute has been very rigorously at-
tacked.8 It is pointed out that the New York statute was
designed to correct certain "abuses" of the minority stock-
holders suit; but as a practical matter, the New York stat-
ute effectively cuts off any further use of the minority
stockholders suit. The reason for this is easy to under-
stand, even in the absence of the convincing statistical evi-
dence presented by other writers. First, it is obvious that
very few, if any, potential litigants are exempted from the
operation of the statute because 5% of the stock of a cor-
2 9 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (1944), af'd, 268 App. Div. 352, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 188
(1944), reversed, 61 N. E. (2d) 435 (1945).30 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416 (1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S. (2d)
754 (1944), appeal denied, 268 App. Div. 978, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 579 (1944).
31 182 Misc. 675, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 703 (1944).
32 New Jersey has avoided this difficulty by expressly making its statute
applicable to actions "not reduced to final judgment" at the time of passage.
N. J. S. A. 14:3-17.
8H ornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in NVew
York (1944) 32 Calif. L. Rev. 123; Zlinkoff, The American Investor and
the Constitutionality of §61-b of the rew York General Corporation Law
(1945) 54 Yale L. J. 352.
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poration is more than the usual amount of stock owned
by a minority stockholder. Similarly $50,000 worth of
stock is a prohibitive figure. If then it can be safely as-
sumed that the minority stockholder will be required to
comply with the statute, the result is that he will have to
post security for the reasonable expenses, including coun-
sel fees, to which the corporation will be subjected, and he
must be prepared to forfeit this security if he loses the
suit if only on a technical defense. These "reasonable
expenses" include not only costs of the corporation but
the costs of the other party defendants for which the cor-
poration is liable by another statute. Clearly the New
York statute, and for that matter the Maryland statute,
is discriminatory in that strict compliance by the stock-
holder owning less than the required minimum of stock
is required, while the large stockholder, who is more likely
to have participated in the transaction complained of, is
excused from posting security in the event he wishes to
bring suit, even though his stock may be pledged to the hilt
and his equitable interest be less than that of one who must
bear the burden of the statute. It goes without further
comment that the statute is an actual "death knell" of
derivative stockholders suits when the enormous potential
expense to the plaintiff is compared with the slight indi-
vidual benefit. It has been suggested that the New York
statute is procedural and hence its only effect will be to
drive the litigation affected by it unto the Federal Courts,"
and a recent decision of a United States District Court
bears out this view. 5
Fortunately the Maryland statute is not so drastic. It is
not thought that the lower exemption ($25,000) in the
Maryland statute is any real relief. But, unlike the New
York statute, the Maryland statute does not require secur-
ity for counsel fees incurred by the corporation on whose
benefit suit is brought. Unless the term "expenses" as
used in the statute has a meaning more comprehensive than
the usual meaning of "costs", 6 the total effect of the Mary-
land statute seems to be only to require security for costs
in derivative stockholders suits brought by resident minor-
ity stockholders since an earlier statute provided generally
"fHornstein, A New Forum for Stockholders (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev. 33, 36.
Boyd v. Bell, et al, D. C. S. D. N. Y., June 29, 1945.
"There is serious doubt in regard to the validity of this assumption.
"ELx-penses" as used in the New York statute has been construed to include
more than "costs" even if counsel fees are excluded, and it would seem to
follow that the same meaning was adopted in Maryland. Needless to say
it is to be desired that the Court of Appeals rule that "expenses" is synony-
mous with "costs".
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for security for costs in suits brought by non-residents.
However the experience of New York and other states
should point up the potential danger in our own statute.
This danger is more than fanciful because the bill as intro-
duced would have required security for reasonable ex-
penses, including counsel fees.3 8
A third legislative enactment has effect on the use of
the minority stockholders bill by removing one -of the
grounds of complaint that the minority stockholders bill
has been used to correct.39 This act provides that a cor-
poration, unless prohibited by its charter, may make rea-
sonable gifts out of profits (1) to the State, its institutions,
agencies or political sub-divisions or (2) to any organiza-
tion for religious, charitable, scientific, civic, literary or
educational purposes. A preamble to the act contains the
recitals that it has been the legislative intent and under-
standing that corporations formed in Maryland have always
had such powers and the purpose of the act is simply to
clarify existing law. Section 2 of the act also states that
nothing in the act shall be construed to require a prospec-
tive construction only since the act does no more than
clarify and declare the law as it has always existed.
The form of this statute immediately raises the question
is there a reasonable basis for believing that under prior
law a corporation had power to make gifts for the above
named purposes. There was certainly no express statutory
authority and the Court of Appeals never passed on the
question. Authority from other jurisdictions indicates,
however, that a corporation probably did not have such
power. It is the consensus of opinion among text writers
that an ordinary business corporation, in the absence of
express charter or statutory authorization, has no power
to make purely gratuitous gifts and donations for which no
consideration is received and where no pecuniary or busi-
ness interest is served.4" There is, however, authority that
even in the absence of statutory or charter authority a cor-
poration may make a gift when some business or pecuniary
interest is directly or indirectly served.41 Although a ten-
dency on the part of the courts to sustain charitable gifts
under this theory is noticeable, the two rules are separate
and distinct.42
17 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, §195.
"First Reading File Copy, S. B. 612.
"Md. Laws 1945, Ch. 1018.
"6 FLrWHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed. 1931) §§2938, 2939; 19 C. J. S.
(Corporations) §768.
4" FLrHsa, CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed. 1931) §§2938, 2940.
4"FIETCmR, supra, notes 40 and 41.
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In a number of jurisdictions there are statutes dealing
with the power of a corporation to make gifts. Such stat-
utes are in effect in Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.43 The National
Banking Act 4 permits a national bank located in a state
which permits corporations to make gifts to make a gift
within certain limits. An examination of these statutes
discloses that some of them may be considered as codifica-
tions of the rule that a corporation may make a gift when
some business or pecuniary interest is directly or indirectly
served. Thus, the statutes in Delaware, New Jersey and
Ohio, and the provision in the National Banking Act, ex-
pressly limit gifts to those which will benefit or contribute
to the protection of the corporate interests. Other statutes
have similar limitations on the types of gifts authorized.
In Massachusetts and New York, the gifts are limited to
those used for the betterment of social and economic con-
ditions in the community in which the corporation does
business. In Illinois, Missouri, New York and Pennsyl-
vania, the power to make gifts is restricted to donees who
are aiding in war activities. It is only in Maryland, Michi-
gan, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas that no such
limitations exist on the type of gifts which are authorized.
Other aspects of the Maryland statute which should be
considered relate to the funds out of which gifts may be
made and the donees to whom they may be made. The
statute as enacted permits gifts only out of profits; al-
though, as introduced, the bill contained no such safeguard.4 5
Among other statutes this provision is not usual since it is
contained only in the North Carolina and Tennessee stat-
utes. If the authorization to make gifts is made dependent
on protection or advantage to business interest, the require-
ment that only profits be used would seem unnecessary;
since it is accepted as good business practice that a cor-
poration may use capital as well as earnings to protect its
business interests by means other than gift. However in
'4 Delaware Rev. Code §2(9); Illinois Bus. Corp. Act §5(m) ; Massa-
chusetts (Gen. Laws, c. 155 §12A; Michigan Gen. Corp. Act §10(1); Mis-
rouri Gen. and Bus. Corp. Act §4; New Jersey Statutes Ann. 14:3-13;
New York General Corporation Law §34, Laws of 1942, chs. 3, 507, 528,
Laws of 1943, c. 48, Laws of 1945, c. 256; North Carolina General Corpora-
tion law §55-26(12) ; Ohio General Corporation Act §8623-119; Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Law §314; Tennessee General Corporation Law §4085;
Texas General Corporation Law art. 1349. In addition to these statutes,
many states have provisions prohibiting the making of gifts for political
and campaign purposes.
4 12 U. S. C. A. §24.
" First Reading File Copy, H. B. 496.
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view of the absolute authority to make gifts granted by
the Maryland statute, it is submitted that it is a wise pro-
vision to require that only earnings and not capital be used
for those purposes. Even if it can be assumed that the
stockholders of a corporation would want to give away the
earnings of their company without benefit to themselves,
it is inconceivable that they would also want to give away
the means of producing those earnings. This assumption
is a difficult one to make since, by the Maryland statute,
the stockholders are neither given the opportunity to
amend the corporate charter to authorize gifts, nor to vote
on the desirability of any particular gift.
The Maryland statute is absolutely unique in respect
to the donees to whom gifts may be made. It is true that
the Michigan statute is silent in regard to the donees to
whom gifts are authorized; but no other statute, except
that in Maryland, expressly authorizes gifts to the State,
its institutions, agencies or political subdivision. All other
statutes seem only to authorize gifts to corporations, asso-
ciations or individuals of a strictly private although char-
itable nature.
Viewed in the light of the common law, the Maryland
statute seems to be more an attempt to confer new powers
on existing corporations than to clarify existing law. If
the legislature is in reality granting new power to existing
corporations, the problem arises whether the legislature
may constitutionally do so. It is possible that the recitals
and findings of the legislature that it has always intended
prior law to include the power to make gifts, among the
other powers that a corporation already possessed, are bind-
ing on the courts. It is equally possible that the courts
will be willing to look through form to substance and find
a fruitful ground for constitutional attack on the applica-
tion of the statute to existing corporations.
The burden of the potential minority stockholder liti-
gant in Maryland has been increased threefold. He must
establish that he owned his stock at the time of the trans-
action of which he complains or that it devolved on him by
operation of law. He must be prepared to post and to for-
feit security for the reasonable expenses incurred by the
corporation in whose benefit he brings suit. He can no
longer complain if the majority stockholders make reason-
able gifts from the profits of the corporation. The first rule
was reached by the Court of Appeals which clarified an
earlier opinion, and it was then codified with a slight
amendment. This rule has received the sanction of the
[VOL. VIII
CROYLE v. CROYLE
majority of jurisdictions in which the question has been
raised. The second rule which was established by statute,
probably does not, in its present form, materially alter ex-
isting law; although, in other jurisdictions, it has become
the instrument which defeats any protection which minor-
ity stockholders can invoke against absolute domination by
the majority stockholders. For that reason, any extension
of the second rule is to be guarded against. The third rule
apparently alters existing law in spite of elaborate assur-
ances by the legislature that it does not. The means by
which the prior law has been altered is almost certain to
bring into question the legality of the statute as applied
to existing corporations. Certainly the Maryland statute
embodies greater liberality in permitting gifts by corpora-
tions than similar statutes in other states both in respect
to the types of gifts authorized and the donees to whom
they may be made.
ALTERNATIVE REASONS FOR SETTING ASIDE
DIVORCE OBTAINED BY FRAUD
Croyle v. Croyle1
This is an original bill in equity whereby the plaintiff
first wife seeks to set aside, as having been obtained by
fraud, a decree for divorce a vinculo matrimonii which her
late husband had obtained against her in his lifetime in
the same court wherein this bill was filed. The defend-
ant is the second wife of the late husband, who is sued
both in her individual capacity and as administratrix
of the decedent husband. The bill seeks, inter alia, a
declaration that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is the
"lawful widow" of the decedent.
The plaintiff and the late husband had been married
for thirty-three years and were living together in the Dis-
trict of Columbia when, because of his cruelty, they sepa-
rated, and entered into a separation agreement under
which the husband was to make payments for the wife's
support. The wife continued to reside in the former home
in the District and the husband (supposedly) removed his
residence to Prince George's County, Maryland.
Subsequently, in Prince George's County, he filed
against the now plaintiff wife a suit for divorce a vinculo
matrimonii, alleging her desertion of him. While know-
' 40 A. (2d) 374 (Md. 1944).
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